offences inserted into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ('Criminal Code'), conceived its task in the following terms:
an appropriate balance must be struck between, on the one hand, the need to protect the community from terrorist activity, and on the other hand, the maintenance of fundamental human rights and freedoms. 4 Likewise, the Australian Law Reform Commission's recent review of sedition approached the process of reform as one of 'balancing anti-terrorism measures with human rights'. 5 A similar approach also characterises the legal policy environment in the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) and elsewhere.
The Critique of Balancing
Although a pervasive feature of public policy in the field of counter-terrorism, the balancing approach has been subject to significant academic criticism. As Jeremy Waldron points out, the concept of balancing must be subjected to careful analytical and empirical scrutiny in the context of counter-terrorism measures. 6 Notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of balancing, there are many objections to its use to guide terrorism law reform. 7 For criminal justice scholars, the balancing debate resonates with the pre-9/11 critique of balancing models applied to guide criminal justice reform. 8 Rather than security versus liberty, the criminal justice debate was framed as striking a balance between crime control and due process, or variants thereof.
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In both contexts, several objections may be levelled at balancing. 10 A common objection is that balancing promotes consequentialism in which the 'ends justify 9 In the criminal justice context, the balancing metaphor is a powerful image, linking to the scales of justice and our adversarial system of justice. For a review of the key contributions to this debate by Herbert Packer, Doreen McBarnet and Andrew Ashworth, see Bronitt and McSherry, above n 8, 36ff. 10 Feminists have also critiqued the bipolar or binary construction of this balancing model, which conceals the significant legitimate interests of victims: see P Easteal, 'Beyond Balancing' in P Easteal (ed), Balancing the Scales: Rape, Law Reform and Australian Culture (Sydney: Federation Press, 1998).
the means', a calculus in which individual interests are sacrificed for community gains. The logic of such utilitarian approaches 11 has even led some US and Australian scholars to propose that torture, if regulated through judicial supervision, may be justified to avert imminent terrorist attacks. 12 Such preventive measures are justified in terms either of self-defence (a doctrine which extends to defence of others and property) or of necessity. In reality, however, in respect of self-defence, this defensive action is not likely to be directed against the perpetrators of terrorism, but rather against 'soft targets' such as the suspected terrorist's associates or family members. A further point of distinction from the typical self-defence scenario here is that the defensive action is not being performed by a private citizen, but by law enforcement officials or defence personnel, thus invoking what amounts to a broader claim of legal justification based on necessity.
The defence of necessity, which admits that there will be circumstances where a person may legitimately break the law, involves the weighing of lesser evils.
There is little case law on the defence, though the courts have held that necessity and duress are unavailable in murder cases -the courts are seemingly hostile to utilitarian calculations in cases that have involved the intentional sacrifice of one person's life to ensure the survival of many. 13 Recognising necessity in torture cases would similarly deny the autonomy and moral existence of the subject as a human being. 14 Even if the torture is 'regulated' so as to avoid the risk of death, the victim of torture is not only subjected to serious pain but also experiences a form of moral death. 15 Respect for human life and human dignity is a paramount value, and in modern times, the common law has not been willing to entertain legal argument about the relative value of one human life over many.
11 'Utility', for Jeremy Bentham, meant the greatest happiness (or welfare) of the greatest number with its maximisation being the proper end of humankind. In the modern law, torture is strictly prohibited, as it is subject to an absolute ban under international human rights law and prohibited under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ('Criminal Code'). 13 In R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273, the English common law established the limits of the defence, denying its availability as a defence to murder in a case of survival cannibalism where the crew, consistent with maritime custom of the time, had drawn lots to determine who they would kill in order to ensure their survival. Similar limitations apply to the availability of the defence of duress under common law. 14 D Manderson, 'Another Modest Proposal' (2005) 10(2) Deakin Law Review 640, 651. 15 As Manderson points out 'our societies have, at least since the Enlightenment, feared pain more than death, believed that human dignity requires absolute protection under all circumstances, and thought torture a more serious act than execution': ibid 649.
Another objection relates to the weight attached to these competing values. Jeremy Waldron reposes the question as how these two societal 'goods' in tension (namely security and liberty) should be justly distributed? 16 A recurrent problem with these balancing models is that there is no indication of the relative weight that should be attached to the competing interests. As a leading criminal justice scholar, Lucia Zedner, put it:
Typically, conflicting interests are said to be 'balanced' as if there were a self-evident weighting of or priority among them. Yet rarely are the particular interests spelt out, priorities made explicitly, or the process by which a weight is achieved made clear. Balancing is presented as a zero-sum game in which more of one necessarily means less of the other … Although beloved of constitutional lawyers and political theorists, the experience of criminal justice is that balancing is a politically dangerous metaphor unless careful regard is given to what is at stake.
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As Michael Freeman points out, the distributive effects between security and liberty are uneven: security is typically enhanced not through interference with our own liberty, but by sacrificing the freedoms of others, typically young Muslim males.
18
Balancing becomes more problematic when we move beyond physical harm to less tangible and direct interests, such as individual or communal security. In this context, security is measured not only by the actual state of being secure, but also the psychological need to feel secure. These feelings will be based in part on a perception of the nature of the security threat and what works to address that insecurity -matters which are rarely determined by empirical evidence but dictated by political imperatives and priorities. Promoting the happiness of the majority (whether or not the policies are evidence-based) necessarily tips the balance heavily in favour of the state over the individual.
In the balance between liberty and security, security is invariably viewed as paramount. 19 A point made by Carne, above n 7: 'The national security aspect in the balance is inevitably given special weighting, producing a structural inequality in that "balance". These considerations suggest a general unsuitability of the balancing paradigm for reconciling national security and democratic interests.' the right to 'human security', which he views as the paramount human right.
20
This 'new' approach, however, distorts the conventional understandings of the right to liberty and to security of person. It also corrupts the new paradigm of human security being advocated by influential human rights and development scholars. Before this recasting by the Attorney-General, the concept of human security had been developed to shift the focus of debate from the security of the state to the security of the people. 21 However, as previously noted, 'in this new era, fundamental human rights related to liberty and security can acquire radically new meanings'. 22 A cursory review of the case law under the 'right to security' in international human rights law would reveal a basic concern with confining the power of the state to coerce its citizens through powers of arrest and detention. 23 Indeed the correct approach, since human rights are not absolute, is to view national security as a competing public interest that may place some necessary and proportionate restriction on the exercise of a particular human right. To be sure, the idea of feeling safe should not be underestimated -there are social, legal and economic dimensions to this, but the promotion of such a feeling can hardly be paramount. Indeed, treating security as paramount can be disastrous, as the International Commission of Jurists noted in the Berlin Declaration:
A pervasive security-oriented discourse promotes the sacrifice of fundamental rights and freedoms in the name of eradicating terrorism. … [S]afeguarding persons from terrorist acts and respecting human rights both form part of a seamless web of protection incumbent upon the state.
24
A further objection to balancing relates to the inverse relationship between liberty and security, namely that more of one thing (liberty) means less of another (security) and vice versa. This underlies the assumption that higher levels of human rights protection or due process necessarily will impede the effectiveness of law enforcement. our civil liberties: sadly it seems that human rights and due process prove too costly precisely at the moment that they are needed most. However, these assumptions are contestable. Recent procedural reforms to the law governing criminal investigation suggest that some innovations, such as the mandatory recording of interviews and custodial access to lawyers, do not unreasonably fetter law enforcement. The practice of taping, though resisted by police initially, has in fact proved to deliver significant benefits for law enforcement, reducing the number of disputed confessions and providing credible evidence to refute suspect allegations of improper or oppressive treatment during investigation. 25 In light of these insights from the field of criminal justice, it is not unrealistic to propose that effective counter-terrorism law can be promoted with high levels of human rights and due process. Indeed, it is important to avoid symbolic legislation, and ill-considered knee-jerk responses that prove to have limited impact or, worse still, to have potential counterproductive effects or unintended consequences.
Human rights law is not a straitjacket for effective counter-terrorism measures. As many human rights lawyers and organisations have pointed out, human rights are rarely unqualified or absolute, with permissible limitations in the name of security on rights such as privacy and fair trial provided they are both necessary and proportionate. 26 Since the legal expression of human rights is rarely unqualified, 27 the correct approach to policy development is to promote strict compliance with (rather than wide derogation from) fundamental human rights protected under international law or contained in domestic human rights legislation. 28 The problem is that this approach to necessary and proportionate qualification is regularly misunderstood by the courts and legislature. As Laurence Lustgarten has pointed out in the context of British courts addressing the human rights standards in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) through the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK):
It often seems something is lost in the transition (or is it translation?) from Strasbourg to the UK courts, a process in which the ECtHR's [European Court of Human Rights] references to the necessary 'balance' between individual rights and public interest has led -not only in the context of terrorism -to the 'balancing away' of defendant's rights in a manner that arguably fails to comply with convention requirements … the practical import is that the seductive metaphor of 'balance' can readily be used to override convention and other protections when the public clamour is loud enough.
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What this suggests is that both the courts and those responsible for legislative policy in these fields must develop a more sophisticated grasp of human rights law. Furthermore, an understanding of these obligations should inform their decision-making.
As well as fostering legitimacy, strict adherence to human rights law and due process may pay dividends in terms of wider compliance with these laws among the citizenry. There is a strong argument from social psychological research that individual compliance with even unpopular and harsh laws can be promoted by the belief that the processes of enforcement and adjudication are legitimate (that is, procedurally fair and just). As the social psychological research on procedural justice reveals, legal systems with a highly punitive criminal justice system, can deliver high levels of compliance with the law when combined with the processes that are perceived to be fair to accused persons.
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A common claim is that human rights observance is too costly in cases involving terrorism. 31 But a wider sweep of the history of criminal justice supports the above hypothesis about the importance of procedural justice to compliance. It is important to recall that 'due process' rights were not forged in the lower courts in relation to minor misdemeanours, but rather were first articulated in relation to serious security offences, such as treason and sedition. The history of the Star Chamber is often misrepresented by common lawyers as one of inquisitorial oppression and torture, overlooking its critical role in forging many of the key 29 L Lustgarten, 'National Security, Terrorism and Constitutional Balance' (2004) 75(1) The Political Quarterly 4, 14. Ashworth makes a similar point that 'balancing' of interests is used indiscriminately, an approach he believes is simply wrong. He criticises the UK application of the ECHR, arguing that the broad brush approach taken does not take into account the hierarchy of rights that is explicit from the Convention structure (created by art 15), and thus a more precise approach is required to correctly apply the protections provided. Specifically, he suggests that although some rights may be 'outweighed' as necessary under a democratic society, others are not to be defeated by public interest, including the right to liberty and security (Art 5) and the right to a fair trial (Art procedural protections that underwrite human rights law today. 32 As Geoffrey
Robertson has pointed out, the key elements of modern Anglo-American justice (such as the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination) are products of periods of intense political repression. Robertson contends that the more serious and inherently political the crime, the greater the legal quest for legitimacy through procedural safeguards, reminding us that it was in trials of treason that prisoners were first permitted defence counsel. Indeed, Robertson has argued that the seventeenth century trial of Charles I -the first trial of a head of state for tyranny and a precursor to modern war crimes trials -provided common lawyers and judges with the opportunity to fashion many significant legal innovations.
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Indeed, a similar point about the importance of the ideology of justice was made by Doug Hay in his study of eighteenth century English criminal justice, and the operation of the 'Bloody Code' under which an increasing number of offences were made felonies punishable by death. 34 In his view, the approach of the ruling class was to manipulate the ideology of law, to use it as 'an instrument of authority and a breeder of values' in order to maintain the legitimacy of the existing social order. Since fear alone could not establish deference to the law, the structures of the law itself might be used ideologically, to establish deference without force, to legitimate the class structure, and to maintain the domination of the holders of property. Hay emphasises how the elements of majesty, justice and mercy, embodied in the practices of the criminal law, served these ends.
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By looking to legal history, albeit briefly, we see that due process of law (with its symbolic and instrumental aspects) was considered more (not less) important during periods of insecurity and state repression. Why is this so? As foreshadowed above, the answer must be legitimacy -put simply, in cases where the political taint of the crime and the threat to security is manifest, the state must play and be seen to play scrupulously by the rules. This has . This is the period in which most of the fundamental due process protections were forged -trial by jury (absent in the Star Chamber), open justice and privilege against self-incrimination. The oppressive features of the Star Chamber can be overstated. As Barnes points out, many of the modern features of due process we associate with the common law were established in the Star Chamber procedureforemost, the right to counsel (which was denied to the common law courts in relation to felony). Moreover, the Star Chamber placed much value on procedural regularity -namely the rigour of pleadings to define issues -and copious legal argument before judgment. An enduring myth, that the chamber promoted confession by torture was not entirely true either: treason was investigated and torture was used, but never by the judges, rather it was the officers working for the Privy Council who used these methods. 
The Making of Terrorism Law: Uncivil Politics of Law Reform
Drawing from this vein of social psychological research discussed above, I would further argue that legitimacy in law is not simply about how the law is enforced by the executive and the judiciary -it is supported by beliefs about the propriety of the process by which the applicable laws are made and reformed. Harsh laws that divide the community may nevertheless be obeyed where there is a genuine effort to consider the concerns and interests in the legislative process. There is much scepticism, in the current political climate, as to whether the existing scrutiny of terrorism law through parliamentary committees or, indeed, through law reform agencies is effective in addressing these concerns and interests.
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The political imperative to act in order to reassure the electorate proves to be irresistible in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Prior to the 2002 reforms, the Attorney-General's Department undertook no systematic review of the reach of 36 The federal government's first proposals relating to terrorism offences contained in the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 departed from its own guidelines and were drafted as absolute liability offences: this egregious departure from the presumption of subjective fault in relation to offences of such a serious nature was justified in the Explanatory Memorandum. Whilst these provisions (as proposed) did not pass into law, the terrorism offences have strict liability elements. existing laws; there was no consideration of whether minor adaptation (with sentence enhancement for crimes with a terrorist motive) could achieve a result more consistent with the existing fabric of our criminal laws. 40 Despite its immense importance, forging new terror legislation has occurred largely 'on the cheap'. With limited time and resources, government has been encouraged to draw on 'off the shelf' solutions. In the Australian context, the legislature has borrowed heavily from UK models in relation to key definitions, and to new legal measures such as control orders and preventative detention. 41 The core definition of 'terrorist act', which triggers many of the counter-terrorism powers and forms an element of a number of the terrorism offences in the Code, was drawn directly from the Terrorism Act 2000 (UK). In one respect, not highlighted in the debates in federal Parliament, the UK definition significantly extends the normal jurisdictional reach of the criminal law. The effect of this borrowed definition is that the terrorist act extends to behaviour that has no connection with Australia. Under the Criminal Code the terrorist act must be done, or the threat made, with the intention of (inter alia): While this definition of terrorism bears similarity to conventional political crimes such as treason and sedition, the extension to any foreign country is a clear manifestation of the globalisation of the concept of security. The recognition that the security of Australia is now dependent upon the security of other states (not just allies) justifies the adoption of expanded offences and powers that promote global rather than exclusively national security. The extended definition has another effect, potentially criminalising persons who support resistance movements that oppose tyrannical and undemocratic regimes. As the English Court of Appeal has noted in a recent case upholding the conviction of a person engaged in action to overthrow the Libyan dictatorship of Colonel Gaddafi:
the terrorist legislation applies to countries which are governed by tyrants and dictators. There is no exemption from criminal liability for terrorist activities which are motivated or said to be morally justified by the alleged nobility of the terrorist cause.
43 40 The lack of a proper process to review or assess the current laws was a feature in both Australia These new offences, which apply universal jurisdiction under Category D extended jurisdiction provisions in the Criminal Code, define terrorism in terms of threats to international security (which have no bearing on our own domestic security). With the adoption of such far-reaching definitions (in both senses of the term), there is a further blurring of the traditional distinction between internal and external security, and a significant extension of the mandate of the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Surely such a significant shift in scope for counter-terrorism law and policy deserved greater critical consideration and public debate! This form of covert law reform is simply unacceptable in modern parliamentary democracies.
This pattern of expedited law reform has prevailed over the past five years.
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The damage to the integrity of the parliamentary process is most evident in the most recent round of reforms: amendments introducing preventative detention and control orders and reframing the offence of sedition in the overwhelming majority related to minor traffic infringements.
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Most significantly, in the context of our discussion of terrorism laws, these extraordinary police powers were enacted hastily, without proper review of the adequacy of existing laws or objective analysis of the underlying causes of these disturbances. 48 With limited time to review such proposals before passage, legislatures are often content to reassure themselves by mandating a review of the law's operation after a specified number of years. This form of post hoc review takes two forms: oversight and periodic review by the Ombudsman; and/or review by independent committees reporting to Parliament. The outcomes of these reviews have thus far not been promising. The first wave of terrorist offences introduced in 2002 has recently been the subject of review by the Sheller Committee; however, confidence in the review process was undermined when the Committee's recommendations were dismissed by the Government. 49 The legitimacy deficit in relation to both the content of terrorism laws, and the processes by which these laws are made and reviewed, is manifest.
There remains a strong belief that our democratic processes, in particular our system of legislative scrutiny and parliamentary committees, can produce laws in a time of emergency that balance the competing interests of security with liberty. 50 It is a strength of our system that citizens and organisations can indeed express concern about the breadth and impact of new counter-terrorism laws, and that scrutiny committees can make significant changes to legislation. Indeed, the Senate Committee reviewing the first wave of terrorism offences introduced in 2002 objected strenuously to the overuse of absolute liability, which resulted in significant remodelling of the Bill.
The post-9/11 environment, however, seems to have privileged some stakeholders in that process, particularly those members of the security and law enforcement communities who are viewed as more knowledgeable about the nature and scale of the threats faced, and expert about the range of legal reforms required to neutralise these threats effectively. While the former claim may be true, the latter is certainly contestable. The deference to counter-terrorism specialists over legal and criminal justice experts manifested itself in the way witnesses were 'oriented' before giving evidence to the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Legislative Assembly Committee on a scheme of preventative detention. 50 Rose and Nestorovska, above n 31, who deride international human rights laws for their 'uncertain applicability in the counter-terrorism context, as fundamental questions arise as to their own universality, immutability, interpretation and application'. They argue instead that the legitimacy of counter-terrorism laws lies 'in their collective approval through a democratic process that enfranchises and effectively reflects the values of the majority of persons who are addressed by those laws': 20-21.
first substantive question (directed to all witnesses) was whether they had been privy to various AFP or Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) briefings on the nature of the terrorist threat to Australia. The import of this line of questioning was unsettlingly clear to the witnesses -clearly the proposers of preventative detention (namely the Prime Minister and Premiers who form the Council of Australian Governments) had received such a briefing, and on the basis of this intelligence were prepared to adopt these measures, with only the ACT Chief Minister willing to impose higher standards of due process because of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). By implication, those who opposed the Bill without such knowledge were simply not qualified to know the seriousness of the threat and what drastic steps are needed to avert devastating terrorist acts. 51 The line of questioning illustrates the power of security culture to sideline critical voices. It is, of course, also disingenuous since the true nature and risk of the terrorist threat is probably unknowable, as the 9/11 Commission itself found to be the case.
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What this discussion supports is the emergence of an uncivil politics of law reform. 53 Those committed to high standards of respect for human rights (even those who have experienced the abuse of emergency powers in liberal democracies in Europe) occupy a very narrow ledge of legitimacy. Commentators arguing for wider powers and laws tend to deride human rights law as vague and illegitimate, echoing Bentham's famous jibe against natural law rights as 'nonsense upon stilts'. 54 On this view, the legitimacy of counter-terrorism laws lies in their democratic origins, and if any critique is entertained, a narrow set of liberal concerns, such as necessity and clarity, are applied to new offences. 55 The criticism that international human rights law lacks democratic foundations overlooks the fact that these human rights are legal rules, which have been ratified by the Australian Parliament! The claim of inherent vagueness also overlooks the significant detailed body of jurisprudence, which has been built up through the cases, particularly those coming out of the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee. This commonsense approach to counter-terrorism, which purports to distance the critics from any moral or political standpoints, embraces a model of law reform that focuses on prevention, pre-emption and precaution, which are examined in the next section.
Preventative, Pre-emptive and Precautionary Models of Counter-Terrorism Law
Prevention is presented by politicians as the principal driving force behind our new laws. The former Commonwealth Attorney-General, Philip Ruddock, justified the 2005 package of anti-terrorism legislation on the basis that it 'ensures we are in the strongest position possible to prevent new and emerging threats'. 56 In Jude McCulloch's view, this package is suggestive of a new paradigm based on 'pre-emption' in the sense that it involves 'prevention of the perceived risk of terrorism ': 57 Under this model it is legitimate to punish and coerce without evidence and before any terrorist act, even a 'terrorist act' under the legislation that involves no harm or plan to do harm. The rationale of prevention takes priority over other considerations including the rights of the accused and the need for reliable and convincing evidence of guilt prior to punishment. Anti-terrorism legislation is 'preemptive' in that it seeks to punish or apply coercive sanctions on the basis of what it is anticipated might happen in the future. 58 In similar terms, Andrew Goldsmith has argued that the counter-terrorism strategies adopted post-9/11 are part of a wider culture of prevention and risk management in society, and the movement to a 'world risk society' and 'government through fear'. He argues that this cultural change gives rise to pressure towards legal exceptionalism, as fear of the unknown (and unknowable) leads to enhanced powers of proscription -a 'small price to pay for greater security'. He suggests that the precautionary principle may be used by governments to implement draconian measures: 'Extreme caution is justified as prudent in response to profound uncertainty. For some however, it merely provides a convenient cover for adopting conservative or even repressive responses.' 59 The precautionary principle, which was first developed in the field of environmental regulation, posits that where the risk of a harm (in this case through terrorist attack) is unpredictable and uncertain, and where the damage that would be brought about by that harm is irreversible, any lack of scientific certainty in relation to the nature of the harm or consequences should not justify inaction. This promotes what Cass Sunstein calls the 'Laws of Fear', in which the precautionary principle displaces risk-based or evidence-based approaches to public policy. 60 Whether this principle should be applied to counter-terrorism policy is highly contentious. Unlike the field of environmental policy, no state has claimed to have embraced the precautionary model for terrorism law.
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Indeed, much of the language of counter-terrorism policy continues to be expressed in terms of either prevention or pre-emption rather than precaution. Nevertheless, upon closer scrutiny the discourse of public policy has shifted from one based on risk assessment and risk management (where policy-makers claim to weigh the likelihood of attack against the costs and benefits of particular strategies) to one based, in the face of uncertainty, on the need for precautionary action. It is possible to detect new counter-terrorism strategies, particularly those using technologies that permit surveillance of suspect 'places' rather than individual suspect persons, and displace or by-pass traditional protective safeguards. siege situation) and that there needed to be a more proactive model -hence the 2006 amendments. These include powers to take defensive action to protect critical infrastructure within Australia, and specifically to take action against hijacked aircraft.
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In using force or other measures against a vessel or aircraft, or ordering such, the ADF member must conform to the requirements of s 51SE(2) or (3), which require that:
• the order was not manifestly unlawful;
• the member has no reason to believe that circumstances have changed in a material way since the relevant order was given; • the member has no reason to believe that the order was based on a mistake as to a material fact, and • taking the measures was reasonable and necessary to give effect to the order.
The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that defence personnel are under strict control, through a chain of command, when they are receiving orders. Subsections 51SE(2) and (3) draw heavily, according to the Explanatory Memorandum, on the principles of the defence of acting under lawful authority (paragraph 37). However, it is probably best described as a hybrid between lawful authority and necessity.
Most contentious, under Division 3B, is the power to use lethal force in order to protect critical infrastructure designated by the authorising Ministers. Section 51T of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) provides:
(2B) Despite subsection (1), in exercising powers under subparagraph 51SE(1)(a)(i) or (ii) or Division 3B [action against aircraft], a member of the Defence Force must not, in using force against a person or thing, do anything that is likely to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, the person unless the member believes on reasonable grounds that:
(a) doing that thing is necessary to protect the life of, or to prevent serious injury to, another person (including the member); or (b) doing that thing is necessary to protect designated critical infrastructure against a threat of damage or disruption to its operation; or (c) doing that thing is necessary and reasonable to give effect to the order under which, or under the authority of which, the member is acting. [emphasis added] By contrast, the law relating to self-defence in the Criminal Code expressly excludes this level of force to protect property. The purpose of the new provisions in relation to aviation security incidents under the Act is to provide clear legal authority for the military to act. The provisions obviate the need to engage in the deliberative exercise of weighing competing interests as required under the law relating to necessity; to evaluate the imminence of the threat posed as required for self-defence; or to resort to the vagaries of prerogative or executive powers in order to defend the realm. The provisions seek to structure the decision-making process -and also to move beyond the reactive 'call-out' model -to designate a set of circumstances where the Chief of Defence is already pre-authorised or prospectively authorised to act (whether in Australia or offshore). In these cases, the military can act without ministerial authorisation or the Governor-General's order.
While the precautionary rationale is apparent in these powers, there are some further features of the legislation that pull against precautionary action. For example, the call-out powers have always raised a concern about excessive or disproportionate force by the military against civilians. To address this, specific measures were included to limit the use of force. Thus, s 51T(3) imposes a duty on defence personnel, where practicable, to first call on someone to surrender before using force likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm. Significantly, the Act seeks to promote more legal certainty for defence personnel by conferring immunity from state and territory criminal law (criminal offences such as murder, causing grievous bodily harm, etc) and ensuring that defence personnel will be dealt with only by reference to offences under the Commonwealth criminal law, and military discipline offences available under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth).
These new counter-terrorism laws move beyond a conventional preventative to a more precautionary model -under this new legislation, key decision-makers are not weighing up competing harms (choosing the lesser of evils) but rather authorising and taking action (including the intentional use of lethal force) where the level of danger to life or limb is unknown or uncertain. This new legislation permits pre-emptive designation of places as critical infrastructure, which authorises the use of lethal force even though there is no prospect that this action would save a greater number of people, and may even foreseeably involve the killing of a significant number of people on the ground where the plane crashes. It is this particular scenario that presents the most serious challenge for human rights law and the right to human life and dignity, which is protected under international human rights law. 
Conclusion
As governments erode established procedures, the lawlessness of terrorism is being met with the lawlessness of counter-terrorism. 66 In undertaking research for this chapter, I repeatedly came across statements that we now live in an 'Age of Terror' in both political and scholarly literature. Although some scholars have argued that this best fits the US experience and may not be replicated around the globe, 67 it seems that many liberal democracies are facing very similar challenges. In the US, Australia and the UK, an uncivil politics of law reform prevails in the field of counter-terrorism. Security culture leaves little space for human rights language and instruments. Under the sway of balancing models and the rationale of promoting preventative or precautionary measures, human rights tend to be traded away as a threshold issue.
The impact of 9/11 on the legitimacy of the law reform process has been highly deleterious: community consultation on draft legislation; the involvement of professional law reform agencies, as well as parliamentary oversight, have been seriously debased (if not sidelined entirely). The question is how long these trends will continue and how best to promote strategies for the civil politics of law reform in which human rights are protected and respected, rather than trumped by security considerations.
The problem in the current and future law reform context will be the likely 'trickle down' effect of this uncivil culture -the normalisation of emergency powers seems inevitable. Indeed, this trend has long been evident in the UK, where exceptional measures (such as the abolition of the right to silence) in Northern Ireland in the 1980s were subsequently brought to the mainland in the 1990s. 68 In Australia, the trend toward the enactment of preventative powers will continue -in relation both to combating terrorism and to ordinary crimes, which target suspect classes or groups rather than individuals.
This chapter has exposed the subtle but significant shift from preventative to precautionary models in the field of counter-terrorism. Prevention no longer seems the objective or end game. Rather, consistent with the precautionary model, in a security environment characterised by uncertainty, the law increasingly favours pre-emptive action, mass surveillance and disruption tactics. The sense of an impending apocalyptic disaster, whether it be environmental or security related, promotes a fatalism in which liberalism and established legal norms are viewed as simply too costly. In truth, there is a serious risk of irreversible harm -not just the harm that terrorism presents to our security, but also the threat that counter-terrorism measures themselves pose to human rights.
As the International Commission of Jurists noted in its Berlin Declaration:
Since September 2001 many states have adopted new counter-terrorism measures that are in breach of their international obligations. In some countries, the post-September 2001 climate of insecurity has been exploited to justify long-standing human rights violations carried out in the name of national security.
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One solution might be to invert the precautionary principle so that protection of human rights (like protection of the environment) is the principal value or objective prioritised. In the face of harm being done to human rights by opportunistic governments around the world, we must act to promote higher levels of protection of human rights even though we may lack knowledge that particular measures will be effective in this respect. There remains a broader debate, for example, over whether the adoption of bills of rights or the existing common law presumptions in favour of liberty provide an effective mechanism for upholding these important rights. Precautionary logic might suggest that we should act now to implement such measures, whilst remaining careful to monitor whether such reforms are having the desired impact. In relation to both the making and the enforcement of counter-terrorism laws, a re-modelled precautionary principle serves to uphold rather than to trade away human rights. It would certainly place human rights protection (and its various institutions) at the heart of regulatory design. In light of the arguments above, this attention to human rights would enhance both the legitimacy and effectiveness of our responses to terrorism (objectives that should be viewed as mutually reinforcing rather than antagonistic in the way that the balancing model presumes). The decision to prioritise human rights is ultimately a political rather than a strictly legal choice, especially so in the Australian system, which lacks an entrenched bill of rights. Somewhat pessimistically, my conclusion is that it is unrealistic to expect any significant policy change in the near future -the prevailing uncivil politics of law reform will regrettably continue to marginalise such unorthodox perspectives.
